

TS #76553
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JSE, R&W
RWT.

31 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: Procedure For NSC 10/5 Matters

REFERENCE: Memorandum Dated 28 October 1952, to the
Members of the PSB, from the DCI (Unsigned),
Subject as Above. (TS #76537)

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has asked me to forward the final revision of the reference memorandum for your written concurrence, in accordance with the agreement reached at the PSB Luncheon on 30 October.

2. It is requested that the attached be substituted for the proposed memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence on the same subject, dated 28 October -- which memorandum should be destroyed.

[Redacted]
Executive Assistant
to the Director

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Enclosure

Memo dtd 30 Oct 52 (TS #76555)

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O/DCI: [Redacted]
Distribution:

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- 1 Each to Addressees (#1 - Secy Bruce; #2 Secy Foster; #3 Adm. Kirk)
2 - Signer (reading - Rm. 126 Adm.; ✓
Official)

DOCUMENT NO. 25
NO CHANGE IN CLASS ☐
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 1, 2
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 10-2
DATE [Redacted]

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Reading

30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Psychological Strategy Board
SUBJECT: Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters

In the field of unconventional and psychological operations the Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating agency charged with carrying out projects in support of national policies. These projects include political and paramilitary operations, the general desirability of which have been determined by the senior departments of the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating agent for these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. The programs and major projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering national policy should be carefully scrutinized before final approval, and the net value of the operations themselves should be periodically assessed by some authority outside the Agency, but representative both of it and of the interested executive departments. The mounting cost of these operations makes such prior assessment and continuous audit a matter of great urgency.

Under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidance and program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of having to assume too much responsibility and authority. While in the field of cold war both vision and imagination are essential, yet these qualities must be controlled by selective judgment of a detached, objective authority.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long period of time. They involve activities which do not lend themselves to precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute terms the successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military operations which require the continuous and increasing application of force toward an abrupt and conclusive ending, activities of this type require a fluctuating effort with no clear termination in prospect. For this reason, it is all the more important that they should not be undertaken unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirability.

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Copy 5 of 9
Page 2

The responsibilities in their respective departments of the individuals who make up the PEB, and the demands made upon their time, are such as to preclude their giving detailed study, analysis and review to the covert operations of CIA. There is needed a method by which these persons can depend, in the exercise of their responsibilities as members of PEB, on the recommendations of qualified subordinates, reserving their personal detailed consideration for those cases and matters which, by their nature, require their direct attention.

Here I have in mind the provision of a few highly qualified officers upon whom the principals could rely completely as their technical advisers, and whom their respective departments would accept in that status. It would be essential that these selected officers have competence to speak with the greatest degree of authority compatible with the individual responsibilities of the members of the PEB on the various matters to be considered, both in their capacity as advisers and staff officers of the three principals and as representatives of the departments from which they are seconded. Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major departments, since this would have the inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the depths of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely discussed by a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking within their departments.

The Board set up a Panel in its paper dated February 20, 1952, subject: "Procedure for Handling 10/5 Matters in PEB". It is not equipped nor staffed for prompt and decisive action. Panels of this size and nature tend to be slowed down by procedural matters, and their energy dissipated.

I believe a smaller group consisting of one representative from each of the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, and with the Director of PEB as permanent chairman, can produce the results we desire, provided these representatives have the work of this group to which they are assigned as their primary responsibility, to take priority over any other work even, if necessary, to the exclusion of other duties. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide an adviser to this Group and the Departments and Agency should furnish aides and clerical assistance as may be necessary.

I would stress to each Member of the Board the importance of selecting a high-quality representative for this Group. Representatives on the present Panel are excellent, but unhappily will not be

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET
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TS-76555
Copy 3 of 9
Page 3

available to us much longer. Replacements must be found of similar stature, and who will have the complete confidence of their respective departments and agency. Needless to say, they require full support from the very top. The success of this project will depend upon the persons selected by us.

Specifically, I recommend the Board amend its previous decisions in this field and follow the procedure set forth below except in such cases as may be otherwise provided by the President.

(1) Each Board member should designate as a member of a reviewing group a senior representative from his department or agency who will be competent to represent such member in the review of NSC 10/5 programs and projects and to make recommendations thereon. When designated, such individual should be fully empowered to obtain quick, responsive and effective action on any such program and project from any level of his department. The work incident to his assignment to this group should have priority over any other work so that he will be sufficiently free of other duties to give all the time necessary for such review. In the case of the Department of Defense, a general or flag officer representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should also be designated as military adviser to the reviewing group.

(2) The Director of PSB should chair the reviewing group.

(3) The reviewing group should not only review NSC 10/5 programs and major projects in the first instance and recommend their approval or disapproval either in whole or in part, but should also periodically review such programs and projects and recommend whether they are to be continued or discontinued, speeded or slowed, increased or decreased.

(4) The reviewing group should propose to the PSB such amendments to the present 10/5 Procedure as will implement the above recommendations, and thereafter propose to the PSB any further procedures which will enable the group efficiently to expedite its review responsibility.

(5) Final action in each case will be taken by the PSB.

If this procedure is concurred in, I recommend that it be brought formally to the notice of the National Security Council as the method which will be followed by the Board in carrying out its responsibilities under NSC 10/5.

SIGNED:

WALTER B. SMITH
Director

WBSmith/jr

Distribution:

Orig - Sec'y Bruce
#2 - Sec'y Foster
#3 - Adm. Kirk

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#4 - D/DCI

#5 - DCI (Rm. 126 - Adm.)

#6 - ER

#7 - DD/P

#8 - Mr. W. Jackson

#9 - DD/A

Washington

April 4, 1951

DIRECTIVE TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

It is the purpose of this directive to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.

There is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board responsible, within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

The Board will report to the National Security Council on the Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned.

The Board shall be composed of:

- a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absence, their appropriate designees;
- b. An appropriate representative of the head of each such other department or agency of the Government as may, from time to time, be determined by the Board.

The Board shall designate one of its members as Chairman.

DOCUMENT NO. 23
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NSC review(s) completed.

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A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sit with the Board as its principal military adviser in order that the Board may ensure that its objectives, policies and programs shall be related to approved plans for military operations.

There is established under the Board a Director who shall be designated by the President and who shall receive compensation of \$16,000 per year.

The Director, within the limits of funds and personnel made available by the Board for this purpose, shall organize and direct a staff to assist in carrying out his responsibilities. The Director shall determine the organization and qualifications of the staff, which may include individuals employed for this purpose, including part-time experts, and/or individuals detailed from the participating departments and agencies for assignment to full-time duty or on an ad hoc task force basis. Personnel detailed for assignment to duty under the terms of this directive shall be under the control of the Director, subject only to necessary personnel procedures within their respective departments and agencies.

The participating departments and agencies shall afford to the Director and the staff such assistance and access to information as may be specifically requested by the Director in carrying out his assigned duties.

The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall examine into present arrangements within their departments and agencies for the conduct, direction and coordination of psychological operations with a view toward readjusting or strengthening them if necessary to carry out the purposes of this directive.

In performing its functions, the board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies.

/s/ Harry Truman

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